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Intercultural relations between Australia and Asia are pivotal to the economic prosperity of the Asia-
Pacific region. However, there appears to be tension between Australian domestic and Asian 
international students at universities in Australia. To measure the degree of trust and patterns of 
discrimination between these groups, the Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) trust game and a series 
of control games were used in framework where each participant played each game against several 
partners. Controlling for individual heterogeneity, domestic students significantly discriminated 
against international students in the trust game, and individual discrimination was preference-based 
rather than based on beliefs towards international students’ trustworthiness. Moreover, the degree of 
in-group favouritism shown by domestic students was negatively correlated with the Big Five 
personality trait of Openness. Intercultural patterns across the games also pointed to a willingness of 
international students to build relations with domestic students. However, the average amount that 
they sent in the trust game was negatively related with the number of semesters studied at university 
in Australia, which may partly reflect cultural adjustment but also institutional disadvantages faced 
specifically by international students. The study furthers understanding of the patterns of discrimi-
nation between domestic and international university students, the nature of this discrimination, and 
illustrates the extent of challenges faced by the Australian tertiary education sector. 
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 1. Introduction 
Social scientists have long sought to understand the elusive notion of social capital, 
how it can be measured or explained and the implications it has for economic 
outcomes (Hall, 1959; Arrow, 1974; Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 
1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Uslaner, 2002). An important issue regarding social capital is 
the notion of trust and how it travels across cultural, ethnic or linguistic boundaries. 
Trade and financial market transactions across national borders, for instance, will 
naturally involve parties from different cultures.
1 With migrations increasingly becoming a global phenomenon most developed 
countries become de facto multicultural. Agents may prefer to transact with those 
from their own culture, discriminating against other groups. In some societies, 
particular cultural groups may be discriminated against or mistrusted by society in 
general (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001). The result may not only be foregone 
benefits from trade, but perpetuation of disparities in income, wealth or economic 
and social opportunities, particularly to the detriment of members from minority 
cultural groups. Understanding intercultural patterns of trust, however, may help 
promote trade between intercultural parties, improving the economic welfare of 
agents of different cultures and harmony in society. 
 
Intercultural relations between Asian and Australian individuals that may differ in 
cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds have substantial economic implications. 
Australia’s economic growth and prosperity has over several decades depended on 
trade with countries in Asia, particularly and increasingly, China, which in turn 
have depended on Australia for vital resources to sustain strong growth, and its 
education sector for the accumulation of human capital.2 There is also substantial 
cultural and ethnic diversity within Australia, with many migrants originating from 
Asian cultural backgrounds. Over the past decade, there has been an increase in 
                                                 
1 A major puzzle in macroeconomics is the low degree of actual financial and trade integration across 
countries vis-à-vis the predictions of neoclassical theory (see Obsfeld and Rogoff, 2000).   
2 For instance Australia is the world largest supplier of coal and China the major importer.   2
international students in Australia, particularly from Asian backgrounds, corre-
sponding to the significant growth of Australia’s education export sector.3  
 
I n  t h i s  s t u d y ,  w e  t h e r e f o r e  a n a l y s e d  the patterns of trust and discrimination 
between Asian international students and Australian domestic students. Relations 
between these groups is important in light of potential knowledge spillovers from 
learning and research activities (see Romer, 1986; Benabou, 1996), and will directly 
affect economic relations between Australia and its Asian trading partners, particu-
larly China, since international students who have experienced life and education in 
Australia are likely to be pivotal for inter-firm and trade relations between the 
countries in the future.  
 
However, there have been growing concerns that the potential for intercultural 
links have not been realised. Instead, language and cultural barriers have limited 
social interaction between international and domestic students at Australian 
universities (Deumert et al, 2005). Some domestic students appeared to harbour 
deep prejudices and resentment against Asian international students (Pryor, 2009), 
while international students have also expressed disillusionment after failed 
attempts to integrate with domestic students (Das and Jensen, 2008). There also 
appeared to be a perception amongst Australian employers that Asian international 
students did not socially integrate in Australia, resulting in severe difficulties in 
securing full-time employment in the Australian labour market (Gilmore, 2009a). 
Institutional factors may also influence the social capital, embodied in the level of 
trust shown by international students, who in recent protests in Sydney and 
Melbourne expressed frustration over issues such as ‘safety, accommodation, visas, 
shonky institutions and travel concessions’ (Gilmore, 2009b).  
 
                                                 
3 Education is the first service export of Australia and the third overall exports only after coal and iron 
ore. 
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In this complex social and institutional setting, we analysed intercultural trust and 
discrimination through a series of abstract economic decision-making tasks based on 
the Berg et al (1995) trust game, which allowed us to measure and understand 
intercultural patterns of behaviour and impact of time at Australian universities on 
trust levels of international students. We sought to answer the following questions: 
 
1) Is there systematic mistrust in the trust game against either international students 
or domestic students by both groups? 
2) Is there discrimination by either international or domestic students against either 
group in the trust game? 
3) If there is discrimination, is the discrimination preference-based, in the sense 
that there is a discrepancy in altruism, or is it statistical or beliefs based, in the sense 
that there is a discrepancy in expectation of return from the discriminated group by 
the discriminating group? 
4) Which factors predict or correlate with the relative degree of discrimination or 
in-group favouritism shown by individual decision makers in the trust game? 
5) How does the level of trust shown by international students change with 
increased time at Australian Universities? 
 
Our main findings are as follows. Controlling for individual heterogeneity, domestic 
students discriminated against international students in the trust game. From 
within-subject analysis of behaviour in the control games, it appears that this 
discrimination was preference-based rather than based on differences in expecta-
tions of return. On the nature of the relevant preferences, a strong negative 
correlation was found between the level of in-group favouritism shown by domestic 
students, and the personality trait of Openness. We also found a worrying trend for 
policy makers in the tertiary education sector of decreasing levels of trust in 
international students as the number of semesters studied increases. 
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This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 details the design of the experiment. 
The results from the experiment and corresponding analysis are contained in 
section 3. Section 4 concludes by discussing the results, their implications, limita-
tions, and the avenues for further research. Both Appendix containing further data 
analysis and matching procedures, and the experimental instructions are available 
online.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
The experiment consisted of 4 sessions, with 24 subjects per session, and 96 subjects 
in total, each approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes long and conducted in the 
Behavioural Research Lab at the University of Sydney between 27/8/2009 and 
2/9/2009. All decisions were made privately in separated computer terminals. Task-
specific instructions were programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007), with some 
general instructions provided in paper.4 Subjects were recruited by responding to an 
email sent to those registered to participate in economics experiments through the 
online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). 
 
Each subject completed an initial questionnaire, six tasks and a post-experiment 
survey. The initial questionnaire and task 1 (a maths quiz) gathered information 
from the subjects used in the identification mechanism of the subsequent tasks. 
Subjects played each of tasks 2, 3 and 4 as Player A (truster) against different Player 
Bs (trustees) for four rounds in each task. These four ‘matches’ were the same across 
the three tasks for each of the subjects.5 Task 2 was based on the Berg et al (1995) 
trust game (Game T) and measured trust and trustworthiness. Task 3 was a modified 
dictator game (Game MD) and controlled for altruism. Task 4 was a trust gamble 
task (Game G) and controlled for sending in the trust game based on expectations of 
                                                 
4 Instructions are available from Daniel Ji (d.ji@econ.usyd.edu.au) or Pablo Guillen (p.guillen@econ 
.usyd.edu.au) upon request. 
5 For example, if player A faced a certain player B in round 3, task 2; they also faced the same player 
B in round 3, task 3 and 4. 
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return. Task 5 was a prediction task (Game P) which directly measured Player A’s 
belief of the expected trustworthiness of selected Player Bs. Task 6 was a unilateral 
risky investment (Game R) that controlled for the subjects’ risk and ambiguity 
attitudes.  
 
Subjects were informed at the commencement of the experiment that they were to 
be paid their earnings of one round from one of tasks 2 to 6 in cash, determined by 
public die throws at the end of the experiment. For tasks where player A and player 
B’s payoffs may depend on their partner’s decision, participants were paid as either 
player A or player B, if the task was selected for payment.6 Probabilistic payment 
implies that subjects cannot hedge their decisions across rounds or tasks, or within 
each round between player A and player B decisions. Furthermore, as we did not 
expect scaling down of stakes in individual rounds (see Laury, 2006), the endow-
ment in most tasks of $30 (Australian Dollars) for player A was therefore fairly 
substantial. At the end of the experiment, one anonymous participant was also 
randomly chosen to be paid $2 per question that they answered correctly in the 
maths quiz (task 1).7 All participants received a show-up fee of $5 in addition to 
their other earnings.  
 
We employed a 2x2x3 (player A international/domestic status by player B interna-
tional/domestic status by trust and trustworthiness/altruism/expectations of return) 
within-subject design based on the framework in Slonim & Guillen (2010) and 
Slonim and Garbarino (2008).8  
 
This framework is within-subject in two senses. First, each subject plays the 
baseline trust game and the control games, as in Ashraf et al (2006). Secondly, 
                                                 
6 If they were paid as player A, their partner in the selected round were paid as player B and vice 
versa. This procedure was described in the instructions at the commencement of the relevant tasks. 
7 Maths scores ranged from 2 to 30. 
8 Our main points of departure from this framework were the introduction Game G and Game R, as 
well as modified procedures for Game T and Game P. 
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subjects play more than one round of each game against different subjects, with 
these being the same subjects that they faced in the control games. Since no 
feedback was provided to participants after each round on earnings in the round, 
the observations of each subject across rounds can then be regarded as independent 
in the sense that there can be no updating of beliefs on the amount player B would 
return, whether for player Bs in general or conditional upon information on player 
B.9
 
2.1. Identification and Matching 
In contrast to many previous intercultural experiments, cultural identification in 
our experiment was one-sided, (e.g. Glaeser et al, 2000; Fershtman and Gneezy, 
2001; List, 2004; Bouckaert and Dhaene, 2004). Player A was given information 
about their Player B partner, but Player B was not given any information on Player 
A. The abstraction allowed us to better control for motivations behind behaviour by 
holding the objective trustworthiness of player B constant against the cultural 
identity of player A. This is also consistent with other ‘cold’ features in the design. 
 
In Games T, MD, G, and P, player A was always given two pieces of information on 
their Player B partners. First, we provided information on the international or 
domestic student status of Player B, elicited through the initial questionnaire. This 
revealed the likely cultural group to which Player B belongs, since most interna-
tional students in the experiment, corresponding to actual university compositions, 
were from Asian cultural background, while most domestic students were from 
Australian background, with the largest proportion being of Anglo-Saxon or 
European ethnicity. We acknowledge that this identifier is not without problems, 
and the demand effect would induce downward pressure on experimentally 
                                                 
9 An interesting ‘strategy method’ in which subjects specified their strategy conditional on the 
information given on their player B partner was used in Falk and Zehnder (2007). However, to the 
extent that subjects may be averse to specifying a ‘strategy for discrimination’, this method may not 
capture more socially unacceptable forms of discrimination such as ethnic or cultural discrimination.  
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observed levels of discrimination vis-à-vis subjects’ actual discriminating tenden-
cies.10 Our results would therefore tend to understate the actual levels of discrimi-
nation between these groups.11
 
The second piece of information we provided was the scores obtained by Player B in 
the task 1 maths quiz, included to reduce the demand effect of providing only 
information on cultural identity, and also to provide a proxy for information on 
ability – which is available in many markets. We also listed the overall distribution 
of maths scores so that subjects were not updating beliefs on the relative perform-
ance of their partners across rounds. 
 
A mechanism was used to generate matchings between player As and player Bs. 
These matchings balanced observations both across subjects within rounds and 
within subjects across rounds, of in-group and out-group matches (see Appendix).  
 
2.2. Task 2: Trust and Trustworthiness (Game T) 
The monetary payoffs for players A and B in Game T, a variant of the Berg et al, 
1995) trust game was, in any given round: 
,, 30
TA T
ij ij j XY π =− + ,  , 3
TB
j ii XY π j = −  
 
Where  is the amount the  th player A decided to send to the  ,
T
ij X i j th player B and 
is the amount that the  j Y j th player B decided to return. Since all participants as 
player B specified a strategy profile which applied to all rounds: 
                                                 
10 Alternative identification mechanisms in the literature include names (Fershtman and Gneezy, 
2001), or appearance (Ferraro and Cummings, 2007), but these methods were not practical for this 
study. As it was also open to us to use English language or cultural acclimatisation tests as indirect 
identification mechanism, which may be less sensitive to the demand effect associated with cultural 
or ethnic discrimination studies, we would have preferred to add across-subject sessions and 
incorporated different identification treatments if a larger budget and pool of subjects was available. 
11 36% of participants in the cultural subsets that we analysed strongly agreed with the question “In 
the role of Player A in Task 2, I ignored the information on whether the Player B was an interna-
tional student or a domestic student in deciding how much money to send to the Player B.” 
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, (3 )
T
jji j YfX = ,  ,  .  [0,30]
T X ∈ , [0,3 ]
T
ji YX ∈ j
                                                
 
All subjects played Game T both as Player B, in the strategy method, and as Player 
A, in the normal method. Unlike in Slonim and Garbarino (2008), subjects first 
made decisions as Player B rather than as Player A.12 This eliminated potential 
behavioural effects on Player B induced by awareness of Player A’s ability to 
discriminate across different Player Bs. To our knowledge, the non-standard 
ordering has not been used in the trust game literature. While we expected this to 
decrease the overall levels sent,13 our results on player B returns did not qualita-
tively differ from previous studies that have used the strategy method in a standard 
ordering.  
 
Following Slonim and Garbarino (2008), the strategy method was used to elicit the 
player B return functions of each participant. Although the strategy method appears 
not to qualitatively affect the pattern of return in the trust game, it has been 
reported to decrease the overall levels of trustworthiness relative to the normal 
method (Casari and Cason, 2009). Playing in both roles in the investment game also 
appears to reduce both levels sent as Player A and received as Player B (Burks et al, 
2003). However, we did not expect these discrepancies to be problematic and 
proceeded based on the reasonable assumption that they do not interact with the 
cultural identity of Player B.  
 
2.3. Task 3: Altruism (Game MD) 
As in Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), we used a modified dictator game to test 
whether there are discrepancies in altruism and surplus maximisation motives 
 
12 At this point, they were neither given information on their potential Player A partners nor told 
that information on Player B partners were to be given to Player A in each of the four rounds in 
which all subjects would play as Player A. 
13 1) By artificial and unfamiliar framing inducing a one-shot game theoretic perspective. 2) By 
assisting subjects in solving the narrowly rational sub-game perfect equilibrium through backward 
induction. 3) Since subjects may overestimate their own levels of altruism or reciprocity. 
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which can collectively be described as preference-based discrimination. In the 
Game MD, Player A sends an amount to Player B. Player B receives triple the sent 
amount, but unlike in Game T, did not have an opportunity to send anything back. 
The monetary payoffs were:  ,, 30
DAD
ij ij X π =− ,  , 3
DBD
j ij X π = ,  .  [0,30]
D X ∈
 
Limitations of Game MD are that it may induce an allocative heuristic for equality 
which is absent in Game T,14 and may not entirely capture the preferences relevant 
to decisions in Game T. In particular, there may be a preference for trust, either 
positively defined, as suggested by neuroeconomic evidence (Kosfeld et al, 2005), or 
negatively defined, as suggested by evidence on betrayal aversion (Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser, 2004). 
 
Based on the above considerations, instead of inferring by deduction from the 
results of Game MD whether discrimination in Game T was statistical or prefer-
ence-based (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001), two direct measures were used to test 
for the presence of statistical discrimination.  
 
2.4. Task 4: Trust Gamble (Game G) 
Game G allows us to extrapolate ‘trust’ based on expectations of returns, independ-
ent of altruism, surplus maximisation motives. Player A, for a given decision, 
received the same payoffs as in Game T, but unlike in Game T, Player A could not 
influence the payoffs of Player B. The return to an amount sent by Player A was 
determined by the Player B strategy profile for Game T. As in Game T, Player A was 
given information about Player B. The monetary payoff to player A in a given round 




ij ij j XY π =− + ,
G
ij X
j  and  , (3 )
G
j ji j YfX = is the amount that player B decided to return in Game T if 
                                                 
14 In an allocation decision, distributive motives such as equality, judgment on neediness and 
deservingness may be more relevant. 
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player A had sent ,  ,  ,
G
ij X [0,30]
G X ∈ , [0,3 ]
G
j ij YX ∈ . There were no payoffs to player 
B, as all participants could only be paid as player A in this task. 
 
If player A only cared about their own monetary payoff, they would send the same 
amount in Game G as they did in Game T. While Game G can be seen as an 
alternative measure of trust to the original investment game, it is no accident that 
Game G is less natural and elegant to describe and comprehend than Game T since 
the notion that both parties in a bilateral exchange gain from trade is arguably 
fundamental to its nature (whether in goods, services, finance, labour or knowl-
edge) and to the realisation of gains from trade.15  
 
2.5. Task 5: Prediction (Game P) 
A prediction task, Game P, was used to directly test for mean statistical discrimina-
tion, i.e. whether there is a commonly held stereotype in respect to the trustwor-
thiness of a particular group, or of the out-group.16 Subjects guessed the mean 
amounts returned by 4 Player Bs in Game T for $45 and $90 received in each round, 
and were given information on the Player Bs. The earnings of subjects in each 
                                                 
15 Two potential behavioural differences between Game G and Game T are: 1) betrayal aversion 
induced by the games (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004), if the true causal factor is Player B’s wilful 
intention to take advantage of Player A’s trust, whereby Player B gains through the same act. For 
instance, contrast the case where an investment venture fails due to incompetence with failure due 
to embezzlement. Relative to Game G, Game T may induce an additional aversion to ‘wilful’ betrayal 
2) Since both Player A and Player B can gain from the exchange in Game T renders it a more familiar 
situation for Player A than Game G, player A might place greater reliance on their repeated game 
heuristics rather one-shot maximisation of narrowly rational preferences. These effects are 
minimised through a series of ‘cold’ features in our design. See Brandts and Charness (2000). 
16 We also considered using a quadratic scoring rule to elicit beliefs on the probability distribution of 
the trustworthiness of international and domestic students across each session. However, this may be 
too complex for to subjects to comprehend withi n  r e a s o n a b l e  t i m e  c o n s traints and the stakes 
involved in variations of probability distributions to be too small for the individual subjects’ 
calculation of beliefs to be worthwhile. Our identification method was also incompatible with the 
elicitation of a probability distribution on trustworthiness, without inducing a higher demand effect.  
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round were determined by the linear departure of their guesses from the actual 
mean of amounts returned by the 4 Player Bs.17  
 
In addition to the aforementioned random payment rule, we also only paid subjects 
for either their guess for $45 or $90 received by player B to minimise hedging. 
Unlike Game G, Game P does not capture second moment statistical discrimination 
against a particular group, based either on belief in the greater variance of, or 
uncertainty in, the group’s trustworthiness.  
 
2.6. Task 6: Risk Attitudes (Game R) 
Risk attitudes specific to the trust game were controlled for through a risky invest-
ment task. Subjects in Game R interacted as Player A with a computer rather than 
human Player B and were given the probability distribution of returns for the 
amount that they chose to send. The payoffs were ,, 30
RR
il il l XR π = −+ , where 
,  . The realised return factor  was randomly determined 
based on round specific probability distributions independent of
,,
R
li l i l Rr X = , [0,2] il r ∈ , il r
, il X . While each of 
the 4 rounds played differed in probability distributions and the level of ambiguity, 
we will only report decisions in round 2, where relevant, as a control for risk 
aversion. In this round, subjects were given an objective probability distribution for 
the return factor, without ambiguity. The design is similar to that used in Houser et 
al (2006). Its advantage over a Holt and Laury (2002) method is that since players 
face a similar situation to the trust game, it controls for risk attitudes specific to the 
trust game.  
 
                                                 




1 Z Y π =− , if  11
, 30 iK K ZY −≤ ,  1 0
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4 11 1
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2 Z Y π =− , if  22
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P
iK π = , if  22
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4 22 1
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, where  2 (90) kk Yf =
2
, iK Z  denotesi ’s prediction for $90 received by the player Bs. 
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2.7. Survey 
All participants completed a post-experiment survey after receiving feedback on 
their earnings in the experiment, while they were waiting for their payments to be 
prepared. The survey consisted of 6 sections: 1) general social attitudes, 2) GSS 
questions and adaptations, 3) various manipulation checks, 4) involvement on 
campus and specific questions on domestic and international students at university, 
5) a short Big Five personality quiz, and 6) miscellaneous demographic questions.  
 
3. Results and Analysis 
Results and corresponding analysis are reported in the next three sub-sections. In 
3.1., we reported between-subject intercultural patterns. In 3.2., we analysed the 
reasons why individual player A decision makers (DMs) discriminated against 
player B partners (partners) or showed in-group favouritism in Game T. Finally, in 
sub-section 3.3., we examined the trend of decreasing average amount sent by 
international DMs as semester studied increases. 
 
Unless otherwise specified, we reported decisions of two cultural subsets of DMs 
and partners comprising the majority of all participants the experiment: 1) interna-
tional students born in Asian countries (excluding the South Asian subcontinent), 
which included 40 out of 49 of all international students in the experiment,18 and 2) 
domestic students of non-Asian ethnicity, which included 27 out of the 47 domestic 
students. We did not include Asian domestic students in the intercultural analysis, 
but this cultural group may be interesting to analyse in the future. For brevity, we 
subsequently refer to the first subset of participants as ‘international’ students, and 
to the second subset of participants as ‘domestic’ students.19  
                                                 
18 The countries of birth of Asian international subjects were China (inc. Hong Kong S.A.R. and 
Macau): 29, Malaysia: 5, Indonesia: 3, Vietnam: 2 and Thailand: 1. 
19 Although we found similar results by confining analysis to only international students of Chinese 
nationality (29 subjects), and domestic students of Anglo-Saxon or European ethnicity (22 subjects), 
we do not further pursue these cultural subsets in the proceeding analysis.  





3.1. Intercultural Patterns (Between Subjects) 
In the following between-subject analysis, we separately examined intercultural 
patterns in the trust game for player A, behaviour of player B, and patterns in the 
games that control for altruism and expectations of return. 
 
3.1.1. Trust Game (Player A) 
On an aggregated level, inter-cultural discrimination by domestic DMs against 
international partners in Game T is not significant.20 On average, domestic DMs 
sent $15.1 to international partners, compared to $17.8 to domestic partners (see 
Figure T1). Using a t-test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the means are equal 
(p=0.179).21 Male domestic DMs sent $17.3 to international partners and $20.7 to 
domestic partners on average (p=0.172), while female domestic DMs sent $9.8 to 
domestic partners and $10.9 to international partners (p=0.616). 
 
The histogram for the amount sent by domestic DMs to international and domestic 
partners respectively shows some degree of discrimination (Figure G1). The relative 
frequency of $0 sent to international partners is approximately double the respec-
tive relative frequency for domestic partners. When we disaggregated domestic 
DMs on the basis of gender, a clearer pattern of discrimination by male domestic 
DMs can be discerned. In particular, the relative frequency for each possible 
discrete decision under $18 sent to international partners is above that for domestic 
partners (Figure G2).  
                                                 
 
21 The p-value is similar using a non-parametric medians test that does not hinge on the normality 
assumption (Mann-Whitney: p=0.172). Unless otherwise specified, we report p-values from t-tests 
rather than non-parametric tests, since results of the latter are qualitatively similar.  
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Figure T1 
Mean (standard deviation) of amount sent ($).
Game T Partner/player B
All International Domestic
DM/player A Obs Mean Sent SD Obs Mean Sent SD Obs Mean Sent SD
All 268 14.65 (9.30) 137 14.43 (9.36) 131 14.89 (9.26)
International 160 13.56 (8.36) 76 13.89 (8.24) 84 13.25 (8.51)
Domestic 108 16.28 (10.36) 61 15.10 (10.63) 47 17.81 (9.90)
Females 140 11.91 (7.22) 67 12.04 (7.02) 73 11.79 (7.46)
International 108 12.39 (7.51) 49 12.86 (7.25) 59 12.00 (7.76)
Domestic 32 10.31 (6.00) 18 9.83 (5.98) 14 10.93 (6.18)
Males 128 17.65 (10.36) 70 16.71 (10.72) 58 18.78 (9.89)
International 52 15.98 (9.54) 27 15.78 (9.65) 25 16.20 (9.60)
Domestic 76 18.79 (10.80) 43 17.30 (11.41) 33 20.73 (9.79)
Game MD Partner/player B
All International Domestic
DM/player A Obs Mean Sent SD Obs Mean Sent SD Obs Mean Sent SD
All 268 6.13 (5.80) 137 6.37 (6.09) 131 5.89 (5.49)
International 160 5.94 (6.30) 76 6.75 (7.37) 84 5.21 (5.08)
Domestic 108 6.42 (4.98) 61 5.90 (3.99) 47 7.09 (6.01)
Females 140 5.66 (4.68) 67 5.55 (4.56) 73 5.75 (4.82)
International 108 5.17 (4.62) 49 5.20 (4.97) 59 5.14 (4.35)
Domestic 32 7.31 (4.57) 18 6.50 (3.13) 14 8.36 (5.90)
Males 128 6.66 (6.80) 70 7.16 (7.21) 58 6.05 (6.27)
International 52 7.56 (8.66) 27 9.56 (9.92) 25 5.40 (6.60)
Domestic 76 6.04 (5.13) 43 5.65 (4.30) 33 6.55 (6.07)
Game G Partner/player B
All International Domestic
DM/player A Obs Mean Sent SD Obs Mean Sent SD Obs Mean Sent SD
All 268 12.63 (10.24) 137 12.96 (10.42) 131 12.27 (10.08)
International 160 12.39 (9.37) 76 13.34 (9.50) 84 11.54 (9.23)
Domestic 108 12.97 (11.44) 61 12.49 (11.52) 47 13.60 (11.43)
Females 140 12.56 (8.27) 67 13.48 (8.03) 73 11.71 (8.46)
International 108 11.56 (7.96) 49 12.55 (7.57) 59 10.73 (8.25)
Domestic 32 15.94 (8.53) 18 16.00 (8.91) 14 15.86 (8.36)
Males 128 12.70 (12.06) 70 12.47 (12.32) 58 12.98 (11.85)
International 52 14.13 (11.68) 27 14.78 (12.31) 25 13.44 (11.16)
Domestic 76 11.72 (12.30) 43 11.02 (12.24) 33 12.64 (12.50)
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There is little aggregated evidence of in-group favouritism by international DMs in 
Game T (Figure G3). $13.89 was sent to international partners on average, and 
$13.25 to domestic partners (p=0.628). Male international DMs sent $15.78 to 
international partners and $16.2 to domestic partner on average (p=0.875), while 
female international DMs sent $12.9 to international partners and $12 to domestic 
partners (p=0.557).22  
 
There is no evidence that, on average, either international or domestic player B 
partners systematically received less in Game T from DMs. International partners 
                                                 
22 This suggests that it was not the imbalance between gender compositions (see Figure T1) which 
drives the result that international DMs did not discriminate against domestic partners. 
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received $14.4 on average, compared to $14.9 received by domestic partners. The 
difference is insignificant (p=0.690).23
 
OBSERVATION 1: There is no evidence of systematic mistrust against either domestic 
or international students. 
 
By ‘systematic’ mistrust, we refer to the phenomenon observed in the Fershtman 
and Gneezy (2001) experiment, whereby both cultural groups sent less to one of the 
cultural groups in the trust game.  
 
The previous aggregated analysis masks substantial individual heterogeneity in 
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++ + + η
 (2) 
for international DMs. 
 
Since amount sent was limited to a decision between $0 and $30, the dependent 
variable, double censored at $0 and $30, can be interpreted as a latent willingness to 
                                                 
23 Differences in distribution of amount sent by international and domestic DMs partly reflect gender 
differences, as our sample included more female international DMs and more male domestic DMs. 
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trust as measured by Game T.24 We also estimated the respective models for Game 
MD and Game G, with similar interpretation for the dependent variables:25
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for domestic DMs, and 
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 (6) 
for international DMs. 
 
As we focused in this section on the pattern of discrimination in Game T, shown in 
models (1)-(2), results for models (3)-(6) pertaining Game MD and Game G are 
reported in the Appendix. Estimated coefficients that relate to discrimination are 
highlighted in grey. See Figure T2 in the Appendix for details on the explanatory 
variables. We abstracted from controls for order effects, which are insignificant for 
Games T and MD and slightly increased the coefficients that measured discrimina-
tion. 
                                                 
24 Double censoring using a Tobit model is standard in the literature since clustering of decisions at 0 
and 30 would result in biased estimates using OLS by violation of the normality assumption. 
25 Models (3) and (4) include all controls in the respective models for Game T and Game G except for 
risk attitudes. 
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Figure M1 
Model (1) 
Willingness to Trust in the Trust Game, Domestic Decision Makers (Random Effects Tobit, censored at $0 and $30) 
  (1.1)  (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) 
Risk  Av  (-)  0.617** 0.805*** 0.790*** 0.789*** 0.712*** 0.746*** 0.754*** 
  (0.251)  (0.215) (0.196) (0.192) (0.187) (0.194) (0.185) 
Female  -9.473** 50.038*** 50.738*** 48.919*** 49.100*** 49.943*** 48.188*** 
  (4.795) (12.169) (11.175) (11.065) (11.832) (12.104) (11.553) 
Age  -2.742** -4.175*** -4.221*** -4.189*** -4.262*** -4.345*** -4.369*** 
  (1.382)  (1.074) (0.985) (0.965) (0.953) (0.975) (0.932) 
GSS Trust (-)  -2.719  -0.854  -0.954  -0.773  -0.631  -0.528  -0.514 
  (2.269)  (1.495) (1.379) (1.358) (1.351) (1.374) (1.326) 
Groupwork 0.676  0.177  0.036  -0.030  -0.018  -0.153  -0.2
  (1.611)  (1.121) (1.034) (1.016) (1.008) (1.033) (0.990) 
Semesters Studied  1.333  2.214**  2.170**  2.205**  2.287***  2.375***  3.079*** 
  (1.110)  (0.991) (0.901) (0.888) (0.854) (0.889) (1.007) 
Societies -0.537  -0.476  -0.297  -0.298  -0.010  -0.086  -0.2
  (1.934)  (1.423) (1.329) (1.309) (1.296) (1.318) (1.276) 
Econ  Major  4.586  15.750*** 15.820*** 16.162*** 15.678*** 15.828*** 15.774*** 
  (4.323)  (4.875) (4.424) (4.361) (4.119) (4.267) (3.956) 
No. of Siblings  4.935***  6.086***  6.057*** 5.992*** 5.567*** 5.552*** 5.536*** 
  (1.833)  (1.367) (1.282) (1.260) (1.236) (1.249) (1.207) 
In-Group Friends  1.016  -1.066  -1.164  -1.206  -1.466*  -1.503*  -1.446* 
  (1.196)  (0.906) (0.833) (0.818) (0.809) (0.828) (0.789) 
Political  Stance  (R)  -4.629** -8.212*** -8.355*** -8.479*** -8.700*** -8.817*** -8.864*** 
  (1.914)  (1.710) (1.604) (1.583) (1.554) (1.581) (1.533) 
Economic  Situation  -3.784 -4.573*** -4.689*** -4.576*** -4.830*** -4.743*** -4.699*** 
  (2.523)  (1.630) (1.513) (1.487) (1.513) (1.532) (1.481) 
Maths  Score    0.868*** 0.875*** 0.889*** 0.783*** 0.771*** 0.753*** 
    (0.295) (0.273) (0.270) (0.263) (0.270) (0.256) 
Maths * Female    -6.664***  -6.706***  -6.793***  -6.630***  -6.713***  -6.690*** 
    (1.388) (1.274) (1.258) (1.190) (1.232) (1.151) 
20 
26 
Intl Pnr (DvI)      -5.387***  -7.126***  -7.085***  -0.616  2.296 
      (1.824)  (2.272)  (2.127)  (5.754)  (6.151) 
DvI * Female        4.870  3.840  3.096  3.084 
        (3.742)  (3.527)  (3.542)  (3.516) 
Partner Maths          0.644**  0.939**  0.936** 
          (0.276)  (0.368)  (0.366) 
Pnr Maths * Female          -0.053  -0.008  0.126 
          (0.490)  (0.487)  (0.498) 
Pnr Maths * Intl Pnr            -0.515  -0.553 
            (0.429)  (0.427) 
DvI * Semesters              -1.221 
              (0.970) 
Constant  85.000** 112.633*** 118.498*** 118.481*** 116.277*** 114.378*** 113.867*** 
  (39.725)  (29.504) (27.196) (26.619) (26.679) (27.137) (26.089) 
Log-Likelihood  -290.779  -275.361 -270.968 -270.119 -266.164 -265.448 -264.656 
Prob>
2 χ   0.00022  0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Observations  108  108 108 108 108 108 108 
Subjects  27  27 27 27 27 27 27 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure M2 
Model (2) 
Willingness to Trust in the Trust Game, International D. M. (Random Effects Tobit, Censored at $0 and $30) 
  (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) (2.7) 
Risk  Av  (-)  0.049 0.062 0.063 0.074 0.045 0.029 0.031 
  (0.156) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.144) (0.142) (0.143) 
Female  -5.535**  -8.066 -8.108 -9.202 -5.621 -5.643 -6.542 
  (2.468) (7.514) (7.476) (7.637) (7.950) (7.784) (7.967) 
Age  -1.375** -1.216* -1.226* -1.243* -1.206* -1.233** -1.215* 
  (0.646) (0.634) (0.633) (0.634) (0.626) (0.613) (0.620) 
Years  in  Aus  0.176 0.577 0.586 0.592 0.588 0.560 0.631 
  (0.891) (0.835) (0.836) (0.843) (0.835) (0.819) (0.847) 
GSS  Trust  (-)  -0.519 -0.712 -0.748 -0.771 -0.758 -0.821 -0.862 
  (0.680) (0.646) (0.646) (0.654) (0.637) (0.631) (0.640) 
Groupwork  -0.208 -0.224 -0.233 -0.226 -0.255 -0.322 -0.321 
  (0.659) (0.665) (0.663) (0.667) (0.656) (0.647) (0.656) 
Semesters  Studied  -2.007** -1.879** -1.891** -1.895** -1.860** -1.792** -2.314*** 
  (0.808) (0.766) (0.760) (0.769) (0.749) (0.744) (0.832) 
Societies  -2.158 -1.958 -2.019 -2.015 -1.831 -1.777 -1.758 
  (1.388) (1.365) (1.348) (1.370) (1.323) (1.296) (1.347) 
Econ  Major  -2.830 -4.582 -4.534 -4.538 -4.712 -4.856 -4.945 
  (3.117) (3.108) (3.107) (3.125) (3.053) (2.996) (3.046) 
In-Group  Friends  0.874 0.587 0.574 0.588 0.493 0.522 0.470 
  (0.590) (0.590) (0.593) (0.595) (0.586) (0.575) (0.585) 
Political  Stance  (R)  -3.036*** -3.413*** -3.440*** -3.428*** -3.384*** -3.464*** -3.532*** 
  (1.035) (1.043) (1.031) (1.045) (1.011) (1.012) (1.026) 
English  Ability  2.692** 2.892** 2.969** 2.991** 2.987** 3.131** 3.206** 
  (1.327) (1.391) (1.369) (1.394) (1.342) (1.353) (1.374) 
Economic  Situation  -0.887 -1.236 -1.208 -1.239 -1.200 -1.181 -1.204 
  (0.873) (0.881) (0.875) (0.886) (0.870) (0.849) (0.875) 
Maths  Score    0.426 0.416 0.410 0.422 0.422 0.422 
    (0.327) (0.327) (0.328) (0.330) (0.322) (0.331) 
Maths  *  Female    0.156 0.161 0.176 0.113 0.129 0.171 
    (0.507) (0.506) (0.508) (0.506) (0.494) (0.508) 
Domestic Pnr (IvD)      -0.750  -1.974  -0.627  3.062  0.339 
      (0.924)  (1.699)  (1.714)  (2.817)  (3.276) 
IvD * Female        1.740  0.833  1.013  1.723 
        (2.027)  (2.036)  (2.026)  (2.065) 
Partner Maths          0.387**  0.278  0.295* 
          (0.157)  (0.169)  (0.167) 
Pnr Maths * Female          -0.184  -0.203  -0.222 
          (0.194)  (0.193)  (0.192) 
Pnr Maths * Intl Pnr            0.301*  0.280 
            (0.183)  (0.182) 
IvD * Semesters              0.810 
              (0.515) 
Constant  58.266*** 51.602*** 52.350*** 53.185*** 46.836*** 44.692*** 46.133*** 
  (16.196) (16.634) (16.442) (16.692) (16.534) (16.335) (16.550) 
Log-Likelihood  -457.657 -455.815 -455.476 -455.121 -450.547 -449.188 -447.949 
Prob>
2 χ   0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Observations  156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Subjects^  39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Standard errors in parentheses, ^ One subject was excluded due to missing data on ‘Years in Aus’. 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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OBSERVATION 2:  Controlling for individual heterogeneity, domestic DMs showed 
significant discrimination against international partners in Game T. Disaggregating 
by gender, discrimination by male DMs is significant, and discrimination by female 
DMs is insignificant. 
 
The first part of the observation can be discerned from model (1.3), where the 
coefficient for Intl Pnr (DvI) is negative and significant (p<0.01). Disaggregating by 
gender in (1.4), the coefficient for male DMs increases. Discrimination by female 
DMs is not significant ( : Intl Pnr+LvI*Female=0, p>0.1). In models (1.5)-(1.7), we 
controlled for the maths scores of partners and the interaction between female DMs 
and partner maths scores, and between partner maths scores and international 
partners. Since domestic DMs attributed (insignificantly) less to maths scores of 
international partners, we cannot directly interpret the discrimination coefficient of 
international partner in these models without fixing maths scores. Nevertheless, for 
an average partner maths score, discrimination remains.  
0 H
 
OBSERVATION 3: There is no significant discrimination by international DMs against 
domestic partners in Game T. 
 
Models (2.3) and (2.4) show that international DMs, whether or not disaggregated 
by gender, did not significantly discriminate against domestic partners. The 
direction of the interaction between maths scores and partner international/ 
domestic status is also positive for in-group partners of international DMs and 
marginally significant in one specification (model (2.6), p<0.1). This suggests that 
DMs attributed ability information more to in-group than out-group. 
 
OBSERVATION  4:  There are some cross-cultural differences in the factors that 
explain trust shown in Game T by individual DMs. 
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This can be seen by a comparison between models (1) and (2) for domestic and 
international DMs respectively in Game T, as well as the corresponding models for 
Game MD and Game G.26 In line with Glaeser et al (2000) and Ashraf et al (2006), 
we found responses to the GSS trust question - “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with 
people?” - to be insignificant in explaining the amount sent in Game T, both for 
domestic (1) and international (2) DMs, although the coefficient is in the expected 
direction. The effect of the GSS Trust question is significant at p<0.05 to p<0.01 for 
domestic DMs in model (5) for Game G, suggesting that attitudinal beliefs on the 
trustworthiness of others may explain trust game behaviour based on expectation of 
returns, but it is insignificant for international DMs. For both domestic and interna-
tional DMs, female and older subjects had sent less.27 The number of siblings has a 
significant positive effect on the amount sent for domestic DMs.28 Number of 
semesters studied at university appears to have a positive effect on trust levels of 
domestic DMs (1), but a negative effect on that of international DMs (2).29 The 
positive relationship between perceived English ability and the amount sent by 





                                                 
26 We express the following caveats: 1) due to recruitment protocols, self-selection bias cannot be 
dismissed. However, if self selection bias is confined to the dependent variable of willingness to trust 
and orthogonal with respect to the explanatory variables, variations in a willingness to trust above 
the threshold which induces self-selection can still be explained in our models. 2) We did not 
estimate interactions of demographics with gender to avoid over-fitting the models. 
27 As the age of our participants in the included cultural subsets ranged only from 18-26, the negative 
e f f e c t  o f  a g e  c a n n o t  b e  d i r e c t l y  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  l i f e - c y c l e  t r e n d s  f o u n d  i n  p r e v i o u s  s t u d i e s  o n  
representative subject samples (e.g. Bellemare and Kroger, 2007; Garbarino and Slonim, 2009). 
28 Number of siblings is not included as an explanatory variable for international students as the 
majority of international student subjects were born in China, which has had a one-child policy 
since 1979. 
29 We return to this trend in Chapter 6. 
   23
















Mean Proportions (Y/3X) Returned by Player B
 
The amount returned by player B in Game T, elicited from each participant in the 
experiment as a strategy profile before they faced player B partners as player A, can 
be analysed to determine whether any patterns of first moment statistical discrimi-
nation based on international/domestic status or the maths score obtained by the 
player B partner is ‘justified’ by differences in the expected proportion return of 
player B, conditional upon information given on player B. The intercept of the 
return function for international students tended to be higher than that for domes-
tic students, and the slope of the return function lower (Figure G4). We conjecture 
that this may be due to the Chinese cultural norm of Ren Qin, which necessitates 
the payment of social and financial debt (see King, 1991; Buchan and Croson, 
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2004).30 It is clear that international students were at least no less ‘trustworthy’ than 
domestic students, on average, as player B. We also estimated the following OLS 
linear regression, reporting robust standard errors, clustered by subject.31
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OBSERVATION 5: While there are insignificant differences on average between the 
proportion returned by international and domestic player Bs in Game T, the 
intercept of the return function for international player Bs is higher, and the slope 
lower with marginal significance, relative to domestic player Bs. 
 
OBSERVATION 6: There is a marginally significant positive relationship between the 
slope of the return function of international player Bs in Game T and the maths 







                                                 
30 We plotted the return functions in Figure G4 of hypothetical proportionate and egalitarian player 
Bs, the latter being identified in Ashraf et al. (2006). Proportionate player Bs return any amount that 
was sent by player A, while egalitarian player Bs return an amount that provides an equal allocation. 
Any potential relationship between reciprocity and amount sent independent of these motives may 
be complex, due to the nature of signalling intention. One indication that there might be reciprocity, 
is the upward kink in return functions at $90 received, as this may signal a possible willingness to 
send even more than the maximum option of $30. 
31 While proportion returned as a function of amount sent appears to be concave above $27 received, 
the departure of the return function from concavity at lower and upper values of amount received 
prompted us to abstract from this trend. 
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Figure M7 
Model (7) 
Proportion Returned by Player B (Linear OLS, Robust Clustered SE) 
  (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5)  (7.6)  (7.7) 
International 0.0530  0.1215**      0.1425  0.4637***  0.5060** 
 (0.0374)  (0.0591)      (0.1235)  (0.1650)  (0.2012)
Amount  Received   0.0128***  0.0088***   0.0160***  0.0182***
   (0.0017)  (0.0029)   (0.0027)  (0.0028) 
Amt Rec * Intl    -0.0042*        -0.0195***  -0.0198*** 
   (0.0024)        (0.0049)  (0.004
Maths     0.0020  -0.0000  0.0041  0.0090  0.00
     (0.0033)  (0.0056)  (0.0034)  (0.0061)  (0.0058)
Maths * Received        0.0001    -0.0003  -0.0004* 
      (0.0002)    (0.0002)  (0.0002)
Maths  *  Intl       -0.0073  -0.0264**  -0.0316***
       (0.0079)  (0.0113)  (0.0113)
Maths  *  Intl  *  Rec        0.0012***  0.0013***
        (0.0004)  (0.0004)
Age          -0.011
          ( 0 . 0 1 0
Female          0.05
          ( 0 . 0 7 1
Amt  Rec  *  Female          -0.004
          ( 0 . 0 0 2
GSS  Trust  (-)          -0.0299
          ( 0 . 0 1 6
GSS  Trust  *  Intl          0.0447*
          ( 0 . 0 2 3
Semesters  Studied          0.0175*
          ( 0 . 0 0 9
Sem  Studied  *  Intl          -0.0492
          ( 0 . 0 2 2
Constant 0.2738***  0.0626  0.2797***  0.1352*  0.2290***  -0.0354  0.23
  (0.0200) (0.0395) (0.0505) (0.0806) (0.0346)  (0.0623)  (0.2328) 












1 )  
25 
9 )  
1 
5 )  
* 
1 )  
 
0 )  
 
8 )  
** 
4 )  
41 
Observations  670 670 670 670 670  670  670 
Subjects  67 67 67 67 67  67  67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
In (7.2), the interaction between amount received and international player Bs is 
negative and marginally significant, while the intercept, interpreted as the predicted 
proportion returned for $9 received, is significantly higher for international 
students than domestic students at p<0.05, consistent with the trend shown in the 
Figure G4. International player Bs were more responsive to the maths score that 
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they obtained in (7.6), with the slope of the return function increasing with maths 
scores ( : Maths*Received+Maths*Intl*Rec=0, p<0.01), while the effect of maths 
scores on domestic student behaviour as player B is insignificant in (7.6) and 
marginally significant in the opposite direction in (7.7). Overall, there appears to be 
little evidence that the overall expected trustworthiness of player B depended on 
their international/domestic status.
0 H
32 The following section also shows that both 
groups did not expect the out-group to be less trustworthy, on average. 
 
3.1.3 Control Games (Player A) 
The control games generally show similar aggregate patterns to Game T of insignifi-
cant in-group favouritism.33 In Game MD, which controlled for altruism, domestic 
DMs sent $5.9 on average to international partners, and $7.1 to domestic partners. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the averages are equal (p=0.223). Interna-
tional DMs sent $5.2 to domestic partners and $6.8 to international partners 
(p=0.124). Disaggregating by gender, there is a marginally significant difference 
between the averages sent by male international DMs to international partners 
($9.6) to domestic partners ($5.4), where p<0.1. Although insignificant, it appears 
that domestic DMs’ in-group favouritism in Game MD was greater than in Game G 
(Figure G5).34  
 
Differences between mean amounts sent in Game G, which controlled for expecta-
tions of return in Game T are also insignificant. Domestic DMs sent $12.5 to 
international partners and $13.6 to domestic partners (p=0.621), while international 
DMs sent $13.3 and $11.5 to international and domestic partners respectively.35
                                                 
32 Results are qualitatively similar when we included all cultural subsets in the analysis. 
33 The analysis controlling for heterogeneity in the control tasks is qualitatively similar. See Figures 
G3-G6 in the Appendix. 
34 Both aforementioned trends are consistent with Chapter 5 analysis. 
35 A significant difference between the amount sent by female domestic DMs to international 
partners ($16) and the amount sent by female international DMs to domestic partners ($10.7) where 
p<0.05, reflects an interaction between gender and cultural differences in decisions made in Game T 
and Game G beyond the scope of the paper. The interested reader may refer Figure T1. 
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Mean Game P Predictions ($) on Amount Returned
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The mean Game P predictions made by international and domestic DMs do not 
reveal evidence of first moment statistical discrimination. On average, there may be 
slight out-group favouritism for both groups (Figure G6), but this is insignificant.36
 
OBSERVATION 7: At the aggregate level, in-group favouritism in Game MD, Game G, 
and out-group favouritism in Game P are insignificant for both international and 
domestic DMs. 
 
That the directions of favouritism (although insignificant) were opposite in Game G 
and Game P is unsurprising, since there may be second moment statistical discrimi-
nation if individuals were risk or ambiguity averse, and believed that they knew less 
about the trustworthiness of the out-group.  
 
3.2. Intercultural Patterns (Within Subjects) 
Given the existence of significant discrimination by domestic DMs against interna-
tional partners in Game T, controlling for individual heterogeneity, one is interested 
in determining the reasons for discrimination by individual DMs. We approached 
this question from the following perspectives: first, in terms of the distinction 
between preference-based and statistical discrimination; and secondly, by examin-
ing the correlates of individual discrimination with demographic and survey 
responses, in particular, the relationship between preference-based discrimination 
and the personality trait of Openness. Finally, we identified a possible heuristic in 




                                                 
36 Subjects returned more than the predictions. A t-test of the null hypothesis that the elicited 
returns for $30 sent for all of the 96 subjects ($36.6) was equal to the predictions on average returns 
($32.3) could be rejected at p<0.05. However, we do not further pursue this digression. 
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3.1.1. Statistical and Preference Based Discrimination 
Post-hoc evidence suggests that subjects based their decisions in Games T, MD and 
G on an anchoring and adjustment heuristic.37 Since each DM faced the same 4 
partners in the same order in these games, and changes across rounds in Game MD 
and Game G measured changes in the level of altruism towards and expectations of 
return from the player B partners respectively, these changes can explain whether 
discrimination by each DM across rounds in Game T can be regarded as preference 
based or belief based (statistical) discrimination.  
 
To keep our analysis tractable, we confined to the situation where the absolute 
change in partner maths score was 3 or smaller, rather than explicitly control for 
changes in partner maths score, since if the change in partner maths score was 
small, DMs were likely to be discriminating against their partner based on interna-
tional/domestic status rather than on maths scores. Consequently, we first differ-
enced the dependent Game T decisions, and explanatory Game MD and Game G 
decisions, estimating the resultant equations using linear OLS, with robust standard 
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37 See Tversky and Kahnemann (1974). 
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Model (8) explains discrimination against international partners.38 Model (9) 
explains discrimination against domestic partners. Model (10) analyses the reasons 
for discrimination by international and domestic DMs. Since model (10) is qualita-
tively similar to (8) and (9), results for (10) are reported in the Appendix. Admit-
tedly, this analysis is limited by the small number of observations. Nevertheless, we 
report the following result. 
 
OBSERVATION 8: Within-subject discrimination by domestic DMs against interna-
tional partners in Game T appears to be explained by preference-based discrimina-
tion, rather than by statistical discrimination. 
 
This can be seen in model (8), where  * IntlPnr Dictator Δ Δ is significant at p<0.01 in 
(8.1), (8.4) and (8.5), but   and  * IntlPnr Gamble ΔΔ * IntlPnr Prediction Δ Δ  are either 
insignificant or negative with marginal significance. In (8.6), discrimination against 
international partners by international DMs in Game T cannot be significantly 
explained by either Game MD or Game G, while the size of the corresponding 
coefficient for domestic DMs increases. Given that the analogous coefficients in (9) 
were small, we refrain from making an analogous observation for discrimination 







                                                 
38  1 , , − − = Δ t i t i i X X X ,  denotes the round in which the decision was made,   if the DM i 
was an international student, and 0 otherwise, and 
[1, 4] t∈ 1 i Intl =
, 1 it IntlPartner =  when DM i’s player B partner in 
round t was an international student and 0 otherwise.  * i Trust IntlPartner 0 i Δ Δ< in two instances – 1) 
when a decrease in trust accompanies a change from a domestic to an international partner, i.e. 
discrimination against international partners, and 2) when an increase in trust accompanies a change 
from an international partner to a domestic partner – i.e. favourable treatment towards domestic 
partners. Although we abstracted from any distinction between discrimination against and 
discrimination in favour of a particular group, this distinction deserves further examination in future 
studies, particularly in respect of whether there is an effect in discrimination patterns analogous to 
reference dependence and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This is not to be confused 
with the distinction between ‘discrimination and nepotism’ identified in Fershtman et al (2005). 
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Figure M8 
Model (8) 
Analysing Discrimination Against International Partners in Game T (Linear OLS, Robust Clustered SE) 
  (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) 
ΔIntl Pnr * ΔDictator 1.547***      1.414***  1.529***  1.670*** 
 (0.181)      (0.323)  (0.161)  (0.460
ΔIntl Pnr * ΔGamble   -0.672*  -0.131  -0.075
   (0.370)  (0.200)  (0.238)
ΔIntl Pnr * ΔPrediction     -0.379    -0.338*   
     (0.461)  (0.179)  
ΔIntl  Pnr*Intl        0.19
        (2.440
ΔIntl Pnr*ΔDict*Intl        -1.682*
        (0.819
ΔIntl Pnr*ΔGamble*Intl        0.43
        (0.538
Constant -6.017***  -9.144***  -10.350**  -6.301***  -7.254***  -6.863**
  (1.511) (2.124) (3.556) (1.735) (1.987) (1.871) 











R2  0.539 0.270 0.062 0.545 0.588 0.648 
Observations  14 14 14 14 14 14 
Subjects  13 13 13 13 13 13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Analysing Discrimination Against Domestic Partners in Game T (Linear OLS, Robust Clustered SE) 
  (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) 
ΔIntl Pnr * ΔDictator 0.132***      0.132***  0.132***  0.164*** 
 (0.034)      (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.046)
ΔIntl Pnr * ΔGamble   0.020  0.017  -0.116 
   (0.073)  (0.068)  (0.113)
ΔIntl Pnr * ΔPrediction     -0.023  -0.022  
     (0.037)  (0.031)  
ΔIntl  Pnr*Intl        0.576 
        (0.432)
ΔIntl Pnr*ΔDict*Intl        -0
        (0.086)
ΔIntl Pnr*ΔGamble*Intl        0.147 
        (0.105)
Constant  4.069*** 4.290*** 4.316*** 4.033*** 4.054*** 4.020*** 
  (0.433) (0.457) (0.388) (0.452) (0.444) (0.552) 







R2  0.228 0.005 0.028 0.232 0.254 0.340 
Observations  18 18 18 18 18 18 
Subjects  15 15 15 15 15 15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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3.2.2. In-Group Favouritism and Personality 
If discrimination by individual domestic DMs against international partners in 
Game T was explained by preferences rather than beliefs, what is the nature of 
these preferences? We therefore calculated a within-subject value for discrimina-
tion for each DM – their ‘bias’ towards international student partners – which is the 
average amount that the DM sent to all international partners that they faced in the 
4 rounds of a particular task, minus the average amount that they sent to all 
domestic partners in that task,39 and examined rank correlations (Spearman’sρ ) of 
subjects’ bias with their individual characteristics elicited in the post-experiment 
survey.40
 
OBSERVATION 9: Discrimination by domestic DMs in Game T and Game MD can be 
significantly explained by individual personality. Domestic DMs who expressed 
higher agreement with Openness questions in a Big Five personality quiz tended to 
send more to international partners relative to domestic partners in these games. 
 
In a simple Big Five personality quiz, with 2 questions for each trait, subjects’ 
responses to the Openness questions are highly correlated within-subject bias in 
Game T. The level of agreement with the statement “I have a vivid imagination: 1) 
Strongly disagree to 7) Strongly agree” is correlated with the Game T bias at ρ = 
0.6697 (p= 0.0009),41 and agreement with “I spend time reflecting on things” is 
correlated with Game T bias at ρ =0.6571 (p=0.0012).42 Correlation of the average 
response to these questions with Game T bias is ρ =0.7393 (p=0.0001).  They are 
also correlated with Game MD bias, our measure of altruism, at ρ = 0.5606 
                                                 
39 See Figure G10 in Appendix for mean bias of international and domestic DMs in the tasks. 
40 Since we excluded observations for which Game T bias = 0, the correlation analysis includes 21/26 
domestic DM observations and 36/40 international DM observations. 1 domestic DM faced only 
international partners. 
41 5 out of the 6 domestic DMs who had strongly agreed with this question had sent more to 
international partners than to domestic partners, and 1 did not show any bias. 
42 The effect remained when we controlled for gender and interactions in linear OLS regressions for 
each question. 
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(p=0.0082), and ρ = 0.4810 (0.0273), but not significantly correlated with Game G 
bias, or expectations of return, atρ =0.0720 (p=0.7565) and ρ = -0.1018 (p=0.6605) 
respectively, suggesting that differences in openness does not affect the formation of 
beliefs on the trustworthiness of the in-group vis-à-vis out-group.43  
 
A priori, Openness could have affected the Game T bias indirectly rather than 
directly. Open individuals may have more out-group friends, and this might have, 
through mistaken application of repeated game heuristics, prompted greater 
generosity towards the out-group due to higher chance of repeated interaction. We 
therefore examined differences between levels of agreement with “I have many 
friends who are international students” and “I have many friends who are domestic 
students”. However, correlation between this friendship bias and the two Openness 
questions are only ρ =0.0992 (p=0.6689) and ρ =0.0127 (p=0.9565) respectively, 
suggesting that openness may be directly causative of discrimination in an economic 
context. The Game T bias is also only weakly correlated with the friendship bias at 
ρ =0.2648 (p=0.2461). 
 
There are no significant correlations with other potentially relevant survey re-
sponses. For example, correlations between agreement with “I often participate in 
study groups with international students,” “I often participate in group work 
assignments with international students,” and “In general, I have had positive 
experiences in completing group work assignments” with Game T bias are 
ρ =0.2532 (p=0.2681), ρ =-0.0263 (p=0.9100) and ρ =0.2152 (p=0.3489) respectively. 
There is also no correlation between Game T bias and bias in the GSS questions. For 
instance, we calculated a bias towards international students from modifications of 
the GSS question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
                                                 
43 We also found some correlation between the ‘Agreeableness’ question “I sympathize with others' 
feelings” at ρ = 0.5104 (p=0.0181), and the ‘Contentiousness’ question “I pay attention to details” at 
ρ = 0.3730 (p=0.0958), with the Game T bias, but insignificant correlation with bias in the control 
games. 
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trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?” replacing “most 
people” with “most international students” and “most domestic students”. The ρ  
between this measure and Game T bias is only 0.0144.44  
 
On the other hand, personality and attitudinal survey responses did not predict bias 
by international DMs. This appears to be consistent with literature in cross-cultural 
psychology and management arguing that cultural norms rather than individual 
attitudes tended to be better predictor of behaviour in exchange and negotiation 
relations for decision makers from collectivist (e.g. China) rather than individualist 
(e.g. U.S.) cultures (Triandis, 1995; Liu et al, 2005). Nevertheless, since both the 
absolute value of the means ($0.65 versus $-3.48) and standard deviation in the trust 
bias (SD: 4.9 versus 6.6) for international decision makers are smaller than for 















                                                 
44 This measure has some correlation with the Game MD bias at ρ =0.4603 (p= 0.0357), consistent 
with the relationship between GSS responses and trustworthiness in Glaeser et al (2000). 
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Within-Subject,International  Students vis-a-vis Domestic Students
 
 
OBSERVATION 10: International DMs appear to have shown more in-group favourit-
ism in Game MD and Game G than in Game T by contrast to domestic DMs, who 
appear to have shown more in-group favouritism in Game T than in Game MD and 
Game G. 
 
This can be seen by comparison of the bias of international and domestic DMs in 
the different tasks (Figure G7).45 We postulate that a heuristic independent of 
altruism and expectations of return based on desire to build mutually beneficial 
                                                 
45 See section 5.2 for the definition of the bias. A qualitatively similar pattern can be seen by 
comparison of the Tobit models (Figures M1-M6). 
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reciprocal partnerships with domestic student was used by international students,46 
while an analogous motive may be absent in domestic students.47 Conversely stated, 
international DMs had sent more to domestic partners when they did not solely 
consider the expected returns from and their levels of altruism towards domestic 
partners. Another possible reason for this trend is higher levels of betrayal aversion 
shown by international students towards the in-group. However, we see this 
possibility as less likely given the cold features in the experimental design.48
 
3.3. Acculturation and Trust Levels 
How does one’s general level of trust change with adaptation or integration into an 
environment or country with a different culture? To answer this question, we 
analysed trust levels of two groups from Asian cultural backgrounds - Asian 
international students and Asian domestic students. The advantage of this analysis is 
that both the behavioural levels of trust observed, as revealed preferences, and 
information on semesters studied or years in Australia are ‘objective’ rather than 
attitudinal information. 
 
We examined responses to the question, “How many semesters have you been 
studying (not including the present semester) at your current university?”  , and 
average amounts sent in the games by Asian international DMs.49  
 
                                                 
46 The heuristic may be similar to the community-building motive identified in Barr (2003) 
47 This discrepancy may be related to networking or Guanxi inclinations in Chinese culture (see 
Triandis, 1995). 
48 See above n29. 
49 We examined semesters studied at university rather than years in Australia to specifically study 
the impact of acculturation on international students at university, a different environment from 
high school. The abstraction from variation of information across rounds is justified since our 
matching mechanism ensured, so far as possible, that each DM received at least one international 
partner, one domestic partner, one partner with a higher maths score and one partner with a lower 
maths score and variations in average information across rounds were orthogonal to the demographic 
characteristics of subjects. Results were qualitatively unaffected when we controlled for information 
on partners in the first round.  
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OBSERVATION  11:  There is a significant negative relationship for international 
students between the number of semesters studied at university and the average 
amounts sent in Game T. Moreover, semesters studied is negatively related to 
expectations of return by their player B partner, as measured by Game G. 
 
Each additional semester studied at the current university by international students 
decreases the average amount sent in Game T and Game G by approximately $1.8 
(Figures G8 and G9). The Spearman’s ρ between average trust (Game T) of Asian 
international DMs and semesters studied is -0.484 (p=0.0016). Between average 
amount sent in Game G and semesters studied, it is -0.435 (p=0.005), while the ρ  
between Game MD and semesters studied is negative but insignificant at -0.170 
(p=0.294).  The fact that the relationship in Game G is qualitatively similar, in 
addition to attribution of underinvestment to beliefs, also suggests that discrepan-
cies in altruism towards the experimenter (a research student who has also studied 
for several semesters at the university) is unlikely to be causing lower amounts to be 
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Figure G8 
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We also estimated a linear regression model for international DMs, reporting robust 
standard errors (Figure M11). 
 
01 ii AverageTrust SemestersStudied Controlsi i β βε = ++ γ +
                                                
 
(11) 
As there is an a priori possibility that international students who had studied for 
more semesters were more likely to self-select into experiments to earn money, due 
to financial strains incurred by increased time in living independently, we exam-
ined responses to the survey question “What was the most important reason for you, 
out of the following, for participating in this experiment? 1) Earn money, 2) Have 
fun, or 3) Learn about economics.” Contrary to this however, of those who had 
studied for 3 semesters or less, 68% responded with “Earn money”, while of those 
who had studied for more than 3 semesters, only 37% responded with “Earn 
money”, with the rest of responses being split between “Have fun” and “Learn about 
economics”. The effects of these responses on average trust are negative and 
insignificant without other controls (11.2), and positive and insignificant with other 
controls (11.4).50  
 
Could the effect of semesters studied on average trust be induced by the mere fact of 
studying at university? However, the analogous effect for all domestic students is 
slightly positive and insignificant (Figure G10).51 Therefore, if studying at university 





50 An a priori possibility is that subjects who had answered ‘have fun’ might have taken the 
experiment less seriously, and that subjects who answered ‘learn about economics’ were more 
inclined play the narrowly rational subgame perfect equilibrium. Smaller ‘importance’ weights on 
observations that answered with ‘have fun’ does not qualitatively affect results.  
51 The result is qualitatively similar for all cultural subsets among domestic students, including 
subsets excluded in the preceding intercultural analysis. 
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Figure G10 
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4. Discussion and Conclusion 
We conclude through a discussion of the results in the experiment, identifying 
limitations of the study and avenues for further research on two issues: discrimina-
tion and in-group favouritism based on culture; and the impact of acculturation on 
levels of trust. Finally, we briefly outlined policy suggestions looking forward for 
improving intercultural relations and the experiences of international students in 
tertiary education. 
 
4.1. Discrimination and In-Group Favouritism 
The results suggest that there is some discrimination by domestic students against 
Asian international students at Australian universities, and the discrimination is 
mainly preference-based rather than statistical. As decision makers in both groups 
had predicted that the out-group was slightly (but insignificantly) more trustwor-
thy, there does not appear to be a miscalibration of first moment beliefs.  
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That there is little statistical discrimination between the two groups is encouraging 
for the state of intercultural relations, and implies that there is no mistakenly held 
stereotype as to the trustworthiness of any group, by contrast to the groups studied 
in Fershtman and Gneezy (2001). Indeed, the fact that discrimination found is 
mainly preference-based discrimination, which is surely less socially acceptable, 
suggests that this is not merely driven by experimentally induced fairness consid-
erations. However, there are two caveats in interpreting the result. First, it may 
only apply in a one-sided knowledge sense, although this has some external validity. 
As pointed out in Johansson-Stenman (2008), an employer is concerned about the 
general trustworthiness of the potential employee, rather than the employee’s 
specific trustworthiness towards the employer. Nevertheless, a two-sided knowl-
edge condition may have higher external validity for other bilateral exchange 
situations. Future research can incorporate both one-sided knowledge and two-
sided knowledge treatments to determine the degree of statistical discrimination 
that arises from the fact  of player B behaviour being conditional on player A’s 
cultural identity, and whether this is correctly calibrated or mistaken.52  
 
Secondly, the relevant beliefs of player A in our study relate to the willingness of 
player B to reciprocate. In an intercultural context, this also hinges on beliefs of the 
cultural norms underlying the behaviour of player B. On the other hand, the 
perceived ability to reciprocate will also be relevant in many exchanges, and may 
not only depend on the perceived technical skills, but also be hindered by language, 
cultural barriers and social skills. Indeed, these factors, relevant to Australian 
employers, operated to the disadvantage of international students (Gilmore, 2009). 
While ability is more likely to be task-specific, and willingness to reciprocate is 
more likely to be applicable to a wider range of situations, both are pertinent in 
determining a general  level of trustworthiness in a given situation. Beliefs on 
                                                 
52 While Yamagishi et al (2005) manipulated knowledge conditions on a within-subject basis in a 
prisoners’ dilemma, future research may seek to use higher stakes and control tasks. 
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ability, particularly with respect to language and communication skills, are there-
fore a natural area for further intercultural research.53  
 
Some implications can be drawn from the preference-based nature of discrimination 
found in this study. First, the within-subject nature of our design suggests that 
individuals may not be averse to conscious preference-based discrimination. This 
may be particularly problematic in markets where opportunities for comparison are 
ample, such as the situation faced by employers in labour markets, and appears to be 
consistent with audit studies that have found cultural discrimination in these 
markets. If preferences are to some extent endogenous to experiences, market 
design may gradually reduce discrimination.54 Future studies may also explore the 
effect of behavioural heuristics and ordering on discrimination, and the dynamics of 
selection and group formation in an intercultural context. A key challenge for these 
studies will be reaching an appropriate balance between internal and external 
validity, thereby complementing the existing observational literature in manage-
ment, cross-cultural relations and psychology. 
 
Secondly, that the individual personality trait of Openness can substantially account 
for within-subject preference-based discrimination by domestic decision makers 
against international partners confirms Gary Becker’s conjecture that ‘tastes [for 
discrimination] may differ simply because of differences in personality’ (Becker, 
1957:9). It is in line with research in psychology (McCrae, 1996), and builds on 
growing evidence that personality can explain variations in decisions made in 
simple games (Meyers, 1992; Boone et al., 1999; Gunnthorsdottir et al, 2002; Evans 
and Revelle, 2008). If personality is exogenous, this implies that between-subject 
distribution of discrimination preferences is also exogenous. Therefore, the neoclas-
sical paradigm of modelling preferences as identical across individuals, with 
endogenous sub-utility explained by habit formation (Stigler and Becker, 1977) may 
                                                 
53 On ability and gender, see Schwieren and Sutter (2008). 
54 Fershtman et al (2005) for instance, identified the effect of anonymity on discrimination. 
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be untenable in light of growing evidence on the role of personality in predicting 
economic behaviour and the stability and empirical verifiability of personality 
(Caplan, 2003). Although there may be reservations against explicit incorporation of 
heterogeneous personality due to a penchant for adherence to neoclassical assump-
tions rather than the interests of tractability (Rabin, 2002), a greater willingness to 
incorporate cross-disciplinary insights into economics is required in order to 
realistically represent the phenomenon of intercultural discrimination, and thereby 
prescribe appropriate policies. 
 
Finally, the results suggest that differences in trust and social capital may not 
merely hinge on beliefs and altruism, but also on other heuristics and preferences. A 
relation-building heuristic in international students may reflect a broader desire of 
international students to build links with domestic students. Indeed, the trend 
found in Chapter 6 may partly reflect disillusionment due to this not been realised. 
Future research can examine the effect of other preferences relevant to social capital 
such betrayal aversion and a preference for trust in an intercultural context (Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser, 2004; Kosfeld et al, 2005). A priori, greater social distance may 
decrease the level of betrayal aversion. On the other hand, agents may be more 
averse to intercultural betrayal if they perceive it to constitute cultural discrimina-
tion against them.  
 
4.2. Acculturation and Trust 
On the effect of adaptation to a new cultural environment (acculturation) on levels 
of trust, we express the caveat that since our findings are post-hoc, a limitation of 
the experimental design is that the intercultural elements may confound results due 
to potential status effects. We would therefore like to conduct further experiments 
without intercultural elements to confirm our findings, particularly to ascertain 
whether status effects interact with semesters studied. 
 
   44
The relationships found between semesters studied and average trust in Asian 
international students and between years in Australia and average trust in Asian 
domestic students suggests that the adjustment from Asian to Australian culture has 
a negative effect on trust levels. We postulate the following reasons. First, macro-
economic empirical (Berggren et al, 2008) and microeconomic experimental 
(Buchan and Croson, 2004) literature suggest that observed attitudinal and behav-
ioural trust levels in China are particularly high relative to many countries, includ-
ing Australia,55 most likely due to cultural norms. Secondly, a possibility emerged 
from the ‘web-based’ intercultural prisoners’ dilemma experiment involving 
Australian and Japanese subjects  that there may be a commonly held stereotype in 
East Asian countries that Australians are particularly fair and trustworthy (Yamagi-
shi et al, 2005). Longer time in Australia may prompt individuals to their update 
beliefs on the trustworthiness of Australians or as implied by Australian cultural 
norms if naïve perceptions were miscalibrated or exaggerated. Thirdly, increased 
time in a foreign country may increase exposure to adverse effects on trust – for 
instance, migrants and sojourners may experience culture shock, ethnic discrimina-
tion, disconnection or loneliness. These factors may be exacerbated by a failure to 
integrate or the institutional problems faced by the particular group.  
 
From a comparison of the trend found in Asian international students and that 
found in Asian domestic students, it appears that acculturation at university has a 
more adverse impact on trust for international students, since the implied coeffi-
cient of years at university from the coefficient of semesters studied on levels of 
trust for international students is approximately -3.6, compared to the coefficient of 
years in Australia for Asian domestic students of -1.18.56 This difference may be due 
to specific institutional disadvantages faced by international students, inter alia, 
                                                 
55 Berggren et al (2008), summarising previous empirical studies, reported attitudinal trust in terms of 
percentage of sample that agreed with the GSS question ‘most people can be trusted’. This percentage 
for China was 60 compared to 39.9 for Australia. 
56 The difference is significant when we include the two groups in a single model. 
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with respect to legal status in Australia, differential treatment in labour, rental 
markets, lack of travel concessions, and higher study fees, which may cumulatively 
aggravate the extent of the third aforementioned factor. Further studies can 
examine the effect of subjective acculturation of changing cultural attitudes on trust 
independent of this third factor, taking endogeneity of these attitudes into account.  
 
4.3. Policy Implications for Tertiary Education 
The results indicate that policymakers in the Australian tertiary education face 
numerous challenges. While emphasis over the past decade appears to have been on 
maximising the immediate pecuniary value of education exports (Marginson, 2009), 
this has perhaps occurred at the expense of ensuring a high quality of experience for 
international students, and more needs to be done in order that the latter increases 
pari passu with the former. Measures can be taken to address two broad areas. 
First, the potential relation-building heuristic in international students that entails 
lower in-group favouritism in situations of mutual gain, and the substantial hetero-
geneity in the altruism of domestic students towards international students, 
dependent on individual personality, raises the potential for increased intercultural 
interaction between these groups at Australian universities. For instance, domestic 
students with high altruism towards international students may self-select into a 
mentoring program which links domestic students with several semesters’ experi-
ence at university and newly enrolled international students. International students 
may also be encouraged participate in university Clubs and Societies based on 
common interest in the sciences or the creative arts, if these societies tend to attract 
individuals with higher levels of Openness. 
 
Secondly, substantial decline in the trust of international students in line with the 
number of semesters studied in Australia suggests that improved support services, 
such as accommodation, language training and career services for international 
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students may be required.57 If public sector operators increased capacity in provision 
of these services, increased competition may also result in improved quality in 
private sector providers. Alternatively, regulation for standards in the private sector, 
and certain legal disadvantages faced by international students, such as lack of travel 
concessions, may be revised.  
 
Nevertheless, there may not be a simple solution to the complex ongoing problems 
surrounding in the tertiary education sector. Greater interdisciplinary attention is 
required given the potential economic and social consequences of failure to address 
these issues. While some appropriate policies may come at a high immediate cost, 
they may be consistent with maximising efficiency by increasing the willingness to 
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